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Small island countries are attempting to deregulate their economies in order 
to provide flexibility to firms operating in an ever changing and challenging 
global market. During this process, regulators and policymakers have 
found themselves under immense pressure from the private sector over the 
nature and degree of regulation of commercial activities. Some argue that 
an economy left to the market will reduce the burden on the State, improve 
efficiency and growth, and thus contribute to the country’s developmental 
objectives. There are others, however, who argue otherwise. They believe that 
competition law and policy can play important roles in the advancement of 
developing countries. We argue that competition policy and law are essential. 
What might vary between countries, however, is the mix between ex ante 
and ex post regulation. While regulatory frameworks are being developed in 
small countries, the State or the regulatory institution might have difficulty in 
undertaking ex post regulation for several reasons. This article demonstrates 
how unfair trading practices and anti-competitive behaviour were curbed in 
Fiji’s telecommunications sector.
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Small island countries are attempting to 
deregulate their economies in order to 
provide flexibility to their firms, which 
are operating in an ever changing and 
challenging global market. For foreign and 
domestic firms, the reduction of barriers to 
trade and the removal of barriers to entry are 
important spurs to competition. Economic 
theorists have long predicted that great 
benefits flow from the competitive process. 
In order to maintain their position in the 
market, firms must constantly improve, 
bringing in new equipment and products 
and improved production processes, seeking 
out cheaper suppliers and new customers, 
and improving management techniques 
and workers’ skills. New firms come into 
the market and prosper if they perform well; 
less efficient firms become unprofitable 
and are forced out. These effects have been 
amply verified by empirical studies of the 
determinants of industrial growth (Baldwin 
2003; Easterly 2001; Khemani 2007).
Regulatory intervention is possible 
only because the State has a very important 
and basic resource that no other agent has: 
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the power to coerce. The State may seize 
money by taxation. The State may ordain the 
physical movement of resources and modify 
the economic decisions of households and 
firms without their consent. But these 
powers of the State can also be utilised by 
an industry to make private gains. There are 
four key ways in which this is possible.
The individual firm, industry or 1. 
industry group might seek direct 
subsidies from the State.
The individual firm, industry or 2. 
industry group might seek control 
over the entry of new rivals.
The individual firm, industry or 3. 
industry group might seek specific 
policies to deal with substitutes and 
complementary products.
The individual firm, industry 4. 
or industry group might seek 
intervention relating to price fixing 
and control.
It is quite common in small economies 
for firms to use their wealth and market 
power to secure political influence, which 
they use to gain protection from the 
inconveniences of competitive pressures, 
undermining the dynamism of the economy 
and the welfare of the country (Khemani 
2007). Competition policy and law play 
important roles in directing an economy 
onto the right path. When they work well, 
competition policy and law help to foster 
an effective competitive process. Countries 
that have a record of effective competition 
law enforcement have experienced higher 
growth (Dutz and Hayri 2001). Without 
pressure from competition, firms do not 
have a yardstick by which to measure 
their performance and thus are less likely 
to change their business practices for the 
better.
The objective of competition policy is to 
ensure that competition in the market-place 
is not restricted in a way that is detrimental 
to the society (Connor and Bolotova 2006; 
Gal 2001). It comprises the set of measures 
and instruments used by governments to 
determine the ‘condition of competition’ 
in their markets (Motta 2004). Competition 
law is also a set of rules, disciplines and 
regulations to discipline market behaviour, 
particularly agreements and practices that 
restrict competition—including attempts to 
create dominant positions through mergers 
(Bernstein 1955; Schatan and Riviera 
2008).
By cracking down on exploitative or 
abusive market behaviour, competition 
law enforcement contributes to what can 
be termed ‘economic democracy’ (Johaniso 
2010). This term has two facets. First, it refers 
to the empowerment of consumers and the 
enhancement of their welfare, as improving 
consumer choice and lowering consumer 
prices increase their economic power. 
Second, the term refers to the benefits to 
firms. Not only do the prospects of firms 
that were hurt by anti-competitive activities 
improve with competition law enforcement, 
the firms that carry out such practices 
also stand to gain as the new competitive 
pressures drive them to perform better 
(Johaniso 2010). As a result, they might 
be able to enter new markets, at home or 
abroad. And as market entry barriers come 
down, entrepreneurship becomes more 
rewarding.
In this article a theoretical basis for 
regulation is provided. The theoretical 
framework is that of the principal–agent, 
in which the principal is the State or the 
regulatory institution and the agent is the 
regulated firm. The principal attempts to 
maximise social welfare under incentive 
constraints that result from the informational 
advantage of the agent and its strategic 
behaviour. This article also examines a case 
of substantial market power in Fiji, as well 
as cases of unfair trading practices and anti-
competitive behaviour, some of which could 
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arise due primarily to particular features of 
small economies.
Fiji is little different from other small 
countries. The country faces structural 
problems in relation to competition. Its 
economy is quite open and vulnerable, 
specialised in only a few production lines, 
and highly dependent on imports. In such a 
case, unregulated markets can pose serious 
problems.
This article first provides a theoretical 
overview of regulation and then examines 
the various regulatory options and tools. It 
then describes how substantial market power 
and cases of unfair and restrictive trading 
practices in Fiji’s telecommunications 
sector were examined by the Commerce 
Commission over the past two years, before 
offering concluding remarks.
Theoretical overview of regula-
tory intervention
There are four schools of thought in the field 
of regulatory economics. These are
the economic-libertarian school1. 
the normative-positive school2. 
the Marxist school3. 
the pragmatic-administrative 4. 
school.
The four schools of thought can be 
summarised by examining their perception 
of markets and government (Figure 1). 
The economic-libertarian school of 
thought
This school sees markets and economic 
growth as the best mechanisms for 
maximising social and economic welfare. 
It argues that regulation is unnecessary, 
that it does not protect the public at large 
but only the interests of powerful groups 
and lobbyists (Posner 1974). It is argued 
that individuals and businesses form 
associations or chambers since collectively 
they can be more successful in collecting 
economic rents and appropriating increasing 
amounts of surplus. In small economies, this 
kind of behaviour is quite prevalent. Such 
groups try to influence politicians to pass 
favourable laws and regulations or policies. 
This behaviour is more prevalent during 
the period close to the preparation of the 
national budget. Stigler (1971:3) argues 
that ‘regulation is acquired by the industry 
and is designed and operated primarily 
for its benefit’. He theorises that all firms 
seek to maximise profits, and profits can 
be increased if competition is reduced 
or governmental subsidies are obtained. 
Those belonging to this school are strong 
advocates of the maximisation of freedom 
of thought and action.
The radical/Marxist, anti-capitalist 
school of thought 
This school sees regulation as an attempt to 
prop up the State and state mechanisms by 
covering for the failures of the capitalists’ 
Figure 1 Regulatory schools of thought




Economic-libertarian school  
of thought
Market failure Normative school of thought Marxist school of thought
Source: http://poli.haifa.ac.il/~levi/regutheories.htm
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mode of production. Its adherents argue 
that surplus creation is the key objective 
of the capitalists’ mode of production. 
More of the surplus could be returned 
to the owners of factors of production if, 
however, capitalists owned fewer of the 
factors of production. Therefore, it is in the 
interest of the capitalists to capture the state 
apparatus and regulatory instruments not 
only to ensure that the capitalists’ mode 
of production survives but also to keep 
ordinary people from owning the key 
factors of production.
The normative-positive school of 
thought 
The normative theory of market failure 
predicts that regulation will be instituted 
to improve economic efficiency and 
protect social values by correcting market 
imperfections. In general, the conclusions 
of this body of theory are that regulation 
occurs because 
the government is interested 1. 
in  overcoming  in format ion 
asymmetries with the operator and 
in aligning the operator’s interest 
with the government’s interest; 
customers2.  desire protection from 
market power when competition is 
non-existent or ineffective; 
operators3.  desire protection from 
rivals; or 
operators4.  desire protection from 
government opportunism. 
Six types of market failure are explored: 
natural monopoly, externalities, public goods, 
asymmetric information, moral hazard, and 
transaction costs. The proponents of this 
school argue that regulators or competition 
authorities should, wherever possible, 
encourage the existence of full information, 
provision of incentives to improve 
performance, and establishment of price 
signals that would improve performance.
Pragmatic-administrative school of 
thought 
This school sees markets and governments 
complementing each other (Gurtoo 2008). 
Bernstein (1955:73) argues that although 
there are ‘unique elements’ in the experience 
of each country, ‘the history of regulatory 
interventions reveals a general pattern 
of evolution more or less characteristic 
of all’ with ‘roughly similar periods of 
growth, maturity, and decline’. The length 
of periods can vary across regulatory 
institutions, and periods can sometimes 
be skipped, but there is yet a ‘rhythm of 
regulation’ that suggests a ‘natural life style’ 
(Bernstein 1955:74). The role of regulators 
is to encourage competition, remove 
information asymmetries, and protect 
consumers and business from unfair trading 
practices. While these measures will initially 
be seen as impediments to the growth and 
development of firms, in the longer run 
they will provide a level playing field for 
consumers and business, thus increasing 
the volume of activity.
In summary, with regard to regulatory 
practice, there exist key actors who attempt 
to maximise their key objectives. There 
are business groups whose objective is to 
maximise profits. Firms with high stakes in 
the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions 
can be expected to focus their resources on 
attempting to gain the outcomes they prefer. 
The members of the public, each with only 
a tiny individual stake in the outcomes, 
will ignore them altogether (Huntington 
1952; Laffont and Tirole 1991; Levine and 
Forrence 1990; Stigler 1971). Next, there 
are politicians who create regulations that 
give them control and thus rent-creation 
options. The behaviour of both of these 
groups conforms to private interest theory, 
which argues that by limiting competition 
or by imposing higher costs on consumers, 
deadweight losses are created. Peltzman 
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(1976:13) summarised the most important 
characteristics of regulation that have 
emerged from the literature.
Compact, well-organised groups 1. 
tend to benefit more from regulation 
than broad, diffuse groups. This 
creates a bias in favour of producer 
groups because they are usually 
better organised than consumer 
groups. The dominant coalition, 
however, usually includes subsets 
of consumers.
Regulatory policy will seek to 2. 
preserve a politically optimal 
distribution of rents across the 
rent-seeking coalition.
Because the political payoff to 3. 
regulation arises from income 
distribution, the regulatory process 
is sensitive to deadweight losses. 
Policies that reduce the total income 
available for distribution will be 
avoided because, other things being 
equal, they reduce the political 
payoff from regulation.
The above theories of regulation provide 
slightly varying explanations about who 
will receive the benefits and burdens 
of regulation and its effects on resource 
allocation and welfare changes in society.
Regulatory options and tools
Regulation options can be classified under 
two broad categories: ex ante regulation and 
ex post regulation. Regulatory authorities 
rely on a mix of these two broad approaches 
to regulation.
Ex ante regulation uses government 
rules and regulations to prevent the private 
sector from delivering socially undesirable 
actions or outcomes. It examines the 
structure and size of markets in terms of 
the number of firms, entry conditions and 
degree of product differentiation (Turvey, 
Hoy and Islam 2001). This set of regulation is 
forward looking in the sense that it sets out a 
framework of firm behaviour in advance. In 
this way, it attempts to minimise deadweight 
losses arising out of anti-competitive 
behaviour or unfair trading practices. In 
doing so, this approach provides certainty 
and confidence for all stakeholders in the 
industry. With such a framework in place, 
transaction costs involved in mediation, 
arbitration and litigation are avoided to a 
large extent. This approach, however, also 
has some pitfalls. While it can prevent an 
over-enthusiastic firm from engaging in 
risky ventures, it can also discourage firms 
from engaging in potentially beneficial 
behaviour. The framework for this behaviour 
is benchmarked to a competitive market 
structure, whereas small economies often 
face an imperfect market structure. In 
small economies, there is also the danger 
that regulated industries could capture 
the regulatory process not only within 
the regulatory body but also within the 
government’s decision-making process.
Ex post regulation examines allegations 
of restrictive trade practices. It uses 
various enforcement options such as 
fines, injunctions or bans to penalise those 
violating the regulations (Turvey, Hoy 
and Islam 2001). Countries have elaborate 
competition laws that not only provide a 
framework for firm conduct but also set 
out the penalties to deal with violators of 
the regulations. The main advantage of 
this approach is that firms are made aware 
in advance of the forms of conduct that 
are not acceptable and the consequences 
of misconduct. This approach, however, 
requires the regulator to prove beyond 
doubt that the firm has behaved in a manner 
that is anti-competitive, is not a fair trading 
practice or lessens competition. The burden 
of proof is on the regulator. Furthermore, 
firms can use the judicial system to drag 
the case on for a long period during which 
thEoRy and PRacticE of REgulation in small EconomiEs: thE fijian ExPERiEncE
159
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 3 © 2010 the australian national university
further damage is done. Multinationals 
can have a ‘field day’ in resource-stretched 
economies as such companies are well 
endowed and have a track record in dealing 
with these kinds of cases.
Examination of substantial market 
power
Examination of the substantial market 
power (SMP) of firms is an essential job 
of regulators. The existence of SMP is 
assessed according to widely acknowledged 
criteria. Market power is considered to 
be the ability to set prices unilaterally. 
An SMP-designated operator often has a 
level of market power that allows it to act 
independently of competitors, suppliers 
and, ultimately, consumers. The analysis 
of effective competition begins with the 
calculation of market shares, in order to 
identify the firms with SMP. The existence 
of SMP cannot, however, be determined 
exclusively on the basis of market share. 
The analysis must be carried out on the 
basis of a thorough analysis of the economic 
characteristics of the relevant market. 
Therefore, we must also examine the nature 
of the barriers to entry to the relevant market 
and the existence of countervailing buying 
power.
Approaches to price control
If a firm is proven to have SMP, the regulator 
can control prices. The regulator can make 
a submission to the relevant minister for 
enactment of a price control order (PCO). 
Once the PCO is in place, the regulator will 
have the power to approve prices. There 




b3. enchmarking approach. 
The rate-of-return approach adjusts 
price levels according to the operator’s 
accounting costs and cost of capital, thus 
restricting the amount of profit that the 
regulated firm can earn. The procedure 
consists of four steps
establish an appropriate asset base1. 
establish an appropriate system for 2. 
calculating allowable costs
establish an appropriate rate of 3. 
return for the asset base
establish a set of prices such 4. 
that the earnings defined as the 
difference between the revenue that 
these prices would yield and the 
associated allowable costs do not 
exceed the allowed rate of return.
In most cases, the regulator reviews the 
operator’s price level in response to a claim 
by the operator that the rate of return that it 
is receiving is less than its cost of capital—or 
in response to the suspicion of the regulator 
or a claim by a consumer group that the 
actual rate of return is greater than the cost 
of capital. Globally, the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) is estimated rather 
than the return on capital. The WACC covers 
both debt finance and equity finance. This 
approach is of some concern given that 
a higher rate of return could be allowed 
than what the firm actually needs, and 
the firm could engage in unnecessary 
investments to demonstrate a higher return 
to shareholders. This effect is commonly 
known as the Averch-Johnson effect (Averch 
and Johnson 1962). On the other hand, 
this approach protects the firms from the 
regulator arbitrarily setting prices without 
any concern for the firm’s financial status.
Under price-cap regulation, which is 
more commonly known as retail price index 
(RPI-X) regulation, after the Littlechild 
(1983) report, the regulator sets the price 
by first determining the cost of delivering 
the service. The regulator can undertake 
cost modelling in which the unit cost is 
estimated and the price is set allowing for 
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an appropriate mark-up. The firm can then 
sell its products and services at any price 
below or equal to the price cap set by the 
regulator. To curb possible price wars and 
anti-competitive behaviour, the regulator 
can also set a price floor; however, this is 
rare. Firms might argue that they have 
made massive investments and thus need 
price protection for some period before the 
price is lowered. In such cases, the regulator 
can adopt a price ‘glide path’ leading to the 
desired price. The price-cap approach is seen 
as a superior approach vis-à-vis the rate-of-
return approach, given that the firm subject 
to rate-of-return regulation has an incentive 
to produce using an inefficient technology 
mix, overstate its costs and under invest in 
cost-reducing innovations.
In benchmarking regulation, the 
operator’s performance is compared with 
that of others and penalties or awards 
are assessed based on the operator ’s 
relative performance. The Fiji Commerce 
Commission recently took a benchmarking 
approach to the setting of interconnection 
rates for local network operators in the 
telecommunications industry. In selecting 
benchmarking data, the commission took 
a number of factors into account including 
prices of services substantially similar 
to those services being assessed. These 
were taken from jurisdictions in which a 
reasonable level of competition exists. It 
also took into account adjustments to reflect, 
among other things, the relative economic 
and social development, demographic and 
geographic factors, the extent of urbanisation, 
scale economies, the state of development 
of the telecommunications sector in Fiji, 
and differences in direct and indirect 
costs, including subscriber acquisition 
costs of providing telecommunications 
services in Fiji. This approach should not 
be utlised alone as there will be differences 
in the operations of the industry located 
in different jurisdictions. Henceforth, a 
combination with other approaches is 
advisable.
Cases of substantial market power 
and restrictive trade practices in 
Fiji’s telecommunications sector
Competition policy and law in Fiji, as 
in all other countries, aim to promote 
effective competition and informed markets, 
encourage fair trading, protect consumers 
and businesses from restrictive practices, 
and control prices of regulated industries 
and other markets where competition 
is lessened or limited. There are various 
types of restrictive trade practices and anti-
competitive behaviour that can be observed. 
These include
collusion: processes of collective •	
decision making in areas such as 
price and quantity setting and market 
sharing, which can result in lessening 
of competition and gaining of unfair 
advantage
price discrimination: setting different •	
prices for different buyers
abuse of market power: where firms •	
holding a dominant position unilaterally 
change prices and output to the 
disadvantage of consumers
lessening of competition: any activities •	
that result in a change in market structure 
towards a monopoly situation
collective tendering: making a collective •	
bid and thus bypassing the core aspect 
of the bidding process
pyramid selling schemes: where revenue •	
streams are guaranteed by creating 
additional members
adulteration: product quality is •	
manipulated and sold
hoarding: stock is withheld to raise the •	
price
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black marketeering: selling goods •	
illegally
limited offers: limited offers and failing •	
to supply as demanded
exclusive dealing: dealings with •	
preferred suppliers only, thus foreclosing 
the market
mergers: takeover of firms leading to a •	
dominant position in the market
bait pricing and bundling: where firms •	
sell a product at a very low price to 
lure the customer to the shop. The 
firm might also bundle the offer, thus 
compelling the customer to buy other 
related products.
In the following section, we examine 
two of the above cases in relation to Fiji’s 
telecommunications sector and describe 
how the Commerce Commission dealt with 
them.
Fiji’s telecommunications sector: a brief 
background
The telecommunications sector in Fiji 
has been undergoing major reforms over 
the past three years. Before 17 January 
2007, Fiji  had one mobile operator, 
Vodafone (Fiji) Limited (Vodafone), one 
landline operator, Telecom Fiji Limited 
(TFL), and the international gateway, 
Fiji International Telecommunications 
Limited (Fintel). Vodafone is a joint venture 
between Amalgamated Telecoms Holding 
Limited (ATH) (51 per cent) and Vodafone 
International Holdings BV (49 per cent). TFL 
is a 100 per cent-owned subsidiary of ATH. 
ATH has rights to manage the government’s 
51 per cent shareholding in Fintel, which 
is a joint venture between the government 
(51 per cent) and Cable & Wireless (49 per 
cent).
On 17 January 2007, the government 
concluded a deed of settlement with ATH 
and its related companies, Vodafone, 
TFL and Fintel, which liberalised the 
telecommunications sector in Fiji.
The deed of settlement enabled 
the government to license Digicel (Fiji) 
Limited (Digicel) to operate public cellular 
mobile telecommunications systems 
and associated networks and to provide 
public cellular mobile telecommunications 
services in Fiji. Digicel began providing 
mobile telecommunications services from 
1 October 2008, thereby effectively ending 
Vodafone’s 14-year monopoly over its 
mobile telecommunication network in 
Fiji. Prior to Digicel’s entry, Vodafone 
launched Inkk Mobile Limited (Inkk) on 
its network. While both Vodafone and 
Digicel have deployed a national mobile 
network, Inkk does not have its own mobile 
telecommunications network. Vodafone and 
Digicel operate mobile telecommunications 
networks based on the Global System for 
Mobile Communications (GSM) standard.
Digicel and Vodafone provide the full 
range of retail mobile telecommunications 
services, including offering users the ability 
to send and receive voice calls, text messages 
and data. Both operators subsidise to 
varying degrees mobile handsets, thereby 
promoting the affordability of handsets and 
increasing mobile penetration rates. The 
charging system for the exchange of voice 
calls is the calling-party-pays (CPP) system. 
Under the CPP system, the calling party 
pays entirely for the call, and the wholesale 
termination rate paid by the originating 
operator is normally passed on to its end 
customer. Digicel has achieved a market 
share of approximately 25 per cent.
Examination of substantial market 
power in the telecommunications sector. 
In March 2009, the Commerce Commission 
noted that telecommunication charges in 
the retail sector were exorbitantly high. One 
of the reasons was the high interconnection 
rates, also known as wholesale rates. 
Interconnection is a critical feature of 
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telecommunications networks, as it enables 
subscribers on one network to call and to be 
called by subscribers on another network. 
In the absence of interconnection, a small 
network operator is unlikely to be attractive 
to potential customers as it would be 
unable to communicate with a significant 
proportion of subscribers to other networks. 
In the following section, we describe the 
Commerce Commission’s examination of 
SMP for the mobile market only.
The examination of SMP requires
definition of the relevant markets: •	
the product/service and geographic 
markets
examination of demand and supply •	
substitutability
examination of countervailing power.•	
Definition of the relevant market. In 
accordance with international regulatory 
best practice, the relevant market is 
defined through the interaction of two 
dimensions—the product/service market 
and the geographic market. The definition 
of the relevant product or service market 
begins with the grouping of products or 
services used by consumers based on their 
final purpose/use. These grouped products 
and services are considered to fall within 
the relevant market if the behaviour of 
the suppliers of the services is subject to 
the same type of competitive pressure—in 
relation to price setting.
The relevant geographic market includes 
the area in which the undertakings are 
involved in the supply and demand of the 
relevant products or services; in which area 
the conditions of competition are similar 
or sufficiently homogeneous; and which 
can be distinguished from neighbouring 
geographic areas. In the telecommunications 
sector, the geographic scope of the relevant 
market has traditionally been determined 
by reference to two main criteria
the area covered by a network1. 
the existence of legal and other 2. 
regulatory instruments.
Given that the relevant market is that 
for voice-call termination on individual 
mobile networks, the geographic scope 
of each relevant product market should 
correspond with the geographic coverage 
of each termination network. Vodafone 
and Digicel are licensed to deploy nation-
wide mobile telecommunications networks 
in Fiji with no regional restrictions. Both 
operators have exploited such licensing 
rights, with each deploying nation-wide 
mobile telecommunications networks. In 
addition, Vodafone and Digicel practise 
rate uniformity throughout the national 
territory. In this regard, the geographic 
dimension of the voice-call termination 
markets in mobile networks corresponds 
with the geographic reach of each mobile 
network under consideration.
Demand and supply-side sub-
stitutability.  There are two main types 
of competitive constraints that can be 
identified: 1) demand-side substitutability; 
and 2) supply-side substitutability. In the 
industrial economics literature, the so-called 
‘hypothetical monopolist test’ (also known 
as the ‘SSNIP test’: small but significant non-
transitory increase in price) is used when 
evaluating the existence of substitutability 
from both the supply and the demand sides.
Demand-side substitutability: as regards 
demand-side substitutability, a network 
operator wishing to terminate a call to a 
mobile subscriber cannot terminate it on 
an alternative network. To do so would 
currently result in the completion of the 
call being unsuccessful. In essence, the 
need to direct traffic to a specific mobile 
network ensures that there is no realistic 
demand-side substitute service available to 
an operator seeking to terminate a voice call 
on a particular mobile network.
thEoRy and PRacticE of REgulation in small EconomiEs: thE fijian ExPERiEncE
163
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 3 © 2010 the australian national university
Supply-side substitutability: from the 
supply-side perspective, another mobile 
network operator cannot terminate traffic 
as long as it does not have access to the 
user profile of the called mobile network, 
in particular those available on the SIM 
card. SIM cards would need to be re-
programmable in order to have supply-side 
substitutability between mobile voice-call 
termination networks, but the technology is 
not currently available. This situation makes 
it impossible for an operator on whose 
network a given voice call originates to have 
the call terminated by an operator other than 
the one chosen by the called party.
A strict analysis of demand and 
supply-side substitutability suggests that 
mobile voice-call termination services 
on individual mobile networks might be 
the relevant market for ex ante regulatory 
purposes. The Commerce Commission, 
however, also examined whether such 
a strict analysis accurately reflected the 
competitive dynamics of mobile voice-
call termination services. Specifically, the 
commission evaluated the extent to which 
the pricing of mobile voice-call termination 
services was constrained by the choices of 
retail customers.
Countervailing power. Countervailing 
buying power can mitigate the ability 
of even a monopolist to control pricing. 
Countervailing buyer power is defined 
as the ability of larger customers within a 
reasonable timeframe to resort to credible 
alternatives if the supplier decides to 
increase prices or to affect the conditions of 
delivery adversely. Factoring in the various 
types of relationships between the relevant 
parties, the Commerce Commission broke 
down the analysis of countervailing buying 
power into three parts. First, countervailing 
power from the viewpoint of retail customers 
was analysed. Second, the countervailing 
powers of fixed-network operators—in 
particular TFL—were analysed. Third, the 
operations of other mobile networks were 
analysed.
Countervailing power of retail clients: 
generally speaking, there are no buyers 
of retail mobile services with enough 
countervailing buyer power to influence 
mobile network operators when setting their 
voice-call termination prices. This situation 
is due mainly to the use of the invoicing 
system based on the CPP principle.
In Fiji, the current pricing system for 
voice calls on mobile networks, regardless 
of whether the call originates from a mobile 
network or a fixed-line network, translates 
into the application of the CPP principle. 
According to this payment method, the 
calling party is responsible for the entire 
payment for the call. In turn, the operator of 
the network on which the call is terminated, 
which is chosen by the called party, defines 
the termination rates associated with voice 
calls on the mobile networks. In this system, 
there is a separation between who pays for 
the call and who chooses the network on 
which it is terminated (that is, the network 
responsible for establishing the termination 
price). Consequently, the overall effect of 
the CPP principle in the retail market-place 
is that, whereas mobile networks have an 
incentive to keep prices of services at a level 
sufficient to attract and retain customers, 
they have less incentive to keep the price 
of calls to mobiles low. This is because 
callers cannot take their business elsewhere 
if dissatisfied, as the caller has to use that 
network to reach that particular number.
Countervailing power of TFL: the 
fixed-network operator, TFL—the leading 
wholesale buyer of the termination service 
of calls originating on the fixed network—is 
responsible for a limited volume of voice 
traffic terminated on mobile networks. 
Consequently, if TFL had countervailing 
buying power and decided not to acquire 
the voice-call termination service offered 
by a particular mobile network operator, 
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it would in theory be able to restrict the 
freedom of a mobile network operator to 
set the price in question that resulted from 
its monopoly of the relevant product market. 
TFL has, however, a limited customer base.
Countervailing power of mobile network 
operators: it can also be considered that 
the monopolistic position of each mobile 
network operator in the termination market 
is not sufficient of itself to determine whether 
each individual operator holds a dominant 
position. Notwithstanding the 100 per cent 
market shares in the relevant markets, the 
operators’ capacity to act independently 
from their competitors and consumers, and 
particularly their capacity to fix the conditions 
of provision of their termination services, 
must also be evaluated. In this context, 
mobile operators might be prevented from 
acting independently of their competitor by 
virtue of any countervailing power arising 
from their mobile competitors.
A review of past negotiations in relation 
to the relevant market, where Digicel and 
Vodafone have set reciprocal prices and 
where any evolution of such pricing could 
not be imposed by any one party on the other, 
suggests that it is not clear that Vodafone 
has sufficient countervailing power as 
a buyer of voice-call termination on the 
Digicel network to rule out the capacity of 
Digicel to act largely independently of its 
competitors and consumers in the relevant 
market. Digicel did not present convincing 
arguments demonstrating that it had sought 
unilaterally to reduce termination prices on 
its network and that its competitors had not 
prevented such action.
Similarly, although Digicel is a significant 
buyer of termination services on the Vodafone 
network, Digicel does not have sufficient 
countervailing buying power on the 
Vodafone network to rule out the capacity 
of Vodafone to act largely independently 
of its competitors and consumers in the 
relevant market.
In conclusion, it is unclear whether any 
buyer of voice-call termination services on 
individual mobile networks has sufficient 
countervailing buying power to offset the 
monopolist position of mobile network 
operators, and so prevent mobile network 
operators from acting independently of 
competitors and consumers, particularly 
by charging prices for these services 
above the competitive level. The fact that 
regulatory restrictions covering voice-call 
termination services on mobile networks 
have always been in operation reinforces 
this conclusion.
Therefore, taking all the factors presented 
into account, it is concluded that the mobile 
companies that operate in the mobile 
voice-call termination markets hold SMP 
in relation to those networks and that such 
SMP will in all likelihood be maintained in 
the short to medium term.
Restrictive trade practices by a mobile 
operator
Restrictive trade practices are quite common 
in the telecommunications industry 
throughout the Asia Pacific region and Fiji 
is no exception. An edited volume of papers 
on reforms in the telecommunications sector 
in the Asia Pacific by Brown, Hossain and 
Nguyen (2004) provides an in-depth insight 
into the industry. With the opening up of 
Fiji’s telecommunications sector in late 2008, 
competition in the industry pushed the 
operators to engage in strategies to acquire 
market share quickly. In September 2009, the 
Commerce Commission received complaints 
that a particular telecommunications 
operator was engaged in restrictive trade 
practices. The allegation was on three 
fronts
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market foreclosure: entering 1. 
into long-term contracts with 
corporate customers prior to entry 
of the competitor, thus effectively 
foreclosing the market
exclusive contracts with traders: 2. 
having exclusive contracts with 
traders to sell its products only
exclusive texting platforms on 3. 
media outlets: texting could be made 
only from a particular operator’s 
network.
The Commerce Commission wrote to 
the network operator stating that it might 
have engaged in unfair and undesirable 
trade practices during the period leading 
up to the launch of the new mobile operator. 
The commission noted that it had further 
reason to believe that such practices could be 
continuing and that they might have included 
the operator misusing its former monopolistic 
position and/or engaging in anti-competitive 
conduct and restrictive trade practices.
The operator was requested to provide 
the commission with copies of all contracts 
it had with corporate clients, media outlets 
and suppliers of its product. Having complied 
with the commission’s requests, the operator 
agreed to revoke all contracts and open up the 
foreclosed segment of the market.
Concluding remarks
In this article, we examine the theoretical 
basis of regulation and its practice in a small 
economy such as Fiji. We note that while a 
competitive market is the desired outcome, 
in small economies the inherent structural 
features of the economy will require regulation 
in sectors where competition is absent or could 
be lessened by incumbents. In such economies, 
competition law might have to address more 
objectives than elsewhere. When developing 
such laws, policymakers have to ensure that 
while consumers are treated fairly, the law 
does not become an impediment to the 
productivity and efficiency of the private 
sector. Any such negative implications can 
have serious developmental implications 
such as on investment and employment 
promotion.
The need to tailor competition law to 
economies at different stages of development 
is important for growth and development. 
Furthermore, the stage of development of 
a country and its market also dictate the 
mix of ex ante and ex post regulation. While 
competition laws provide the framework 
for ex ante behaviour, ex post regulation is 
inevitable in small economies. Hence, state 
and competition authorities must be well 
resourced to ensure that ex post regulation 
eliminates unfair trading practices and anti-
competitive behaviour in the longer run.
The work of a regulator can be made 
easier if the State and state institutions work 
closely with the regulatory authority. There 
are a number of ways in which this can be 
facilitated. First, state institutions must be 
forthcoming with key information such as 
audited financials held by the tax authority. 
Government should closely examine policy 
changes that might have an impact on 
the determinations of regulatory bodies. 
For example, import tariff changes and 
devaluation are some of the actions that 
clearly impact on a regulatory authority’s 
work. Injunctions and court orders are 
also very important tools for the work of 
the regulatory body, and thus the judiciary 
must be well versed with the Commerce 
Commission’s work and objectives. Finally, 
the attorney-general’s office plays a very 
important role in approval of price control 
orders, and thus efficiency in its examination 
of the submissions and approval is critical 
to the Commerce Commission’s work. 
In summary, all stakeholders must fully 
understand and appreciate the work of the 
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